On
July 21, 2005, Joseph H. Boardman, Administrator of the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), testified on grade-crossing
safety before the Subcommittee on Railroads of the Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House
of Representatives. Given the extensive public information,
literature, and analyses on the subject, it would have
been appropriate for Mr. Boardman to address three lingering
questions:
- Is there
a clear understanding of the relative causes of grade-crossing
accidents, and if not, why not?
- In that the
Federal Highway Administration (FHA) and the American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) established sight-obstruction standards for
motorists approaching grade crossings, why haven’t
similar standards (on railroad property) been adopted
by FRA?
- Since gates
are clearly the most effective warning device at grade
crossings, why does FRA stress motorist education (not
proven to be effective) over the installation of gates?
Unfortunately,
after assigning his agency much credit for the declining
accident rate at grade crossings – in a manner similar
to other interest groups – the FRA Administrator
failed to adequately address any of the above questions,
as discussed below.
I.
RELATIVE CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS
First, the Administrator
admits that FRA’s reporting system does not call
for assignment of a “cause code” unless the
event also qualifies as a train accident. However,
the accident form has a narrative section that should
include any information that increases our knowledge of
the reasons why the accident occurred and its consequences.
Mr. Boardman goes on to state that: The DOT Office
of the Inspector General audit report dated June 16, 2004
. . . found that 2,368 or 93 percent of the 2,543 public
grade crossing accidents and 242 or 83 percent of the 293
fatalities occurred because drivers in risky behavior or
exercised poor judgment at crossings with active and passive
warnings. The illogic of the FRA’s conclusion
is apparent to students of the subject. Railroads fill
out the accident reports at issue and in their narrative
descriptions of grade-crossing accidents, they universally
blame motorist “failure to yield” as the cause.
But what is most incredible about FRA’s conclusion
is that its source – DOT’s Inspector General – relied
on those railroad reports for its statistical conclusions.
Needless to say, it is folly to rely on bias railroad narratives
from accident reports completed weeks after grade-crossing
accidents occur, for conclusions regarding the relative
causes of such accidents. It is also inappropriate to cite
the Inspector General for the source of data when in fact,
the fact derives from railroad-industry reports. This is
a “Catch 22” event illuminated.
II.
MOTORIST SIGHT OBSTRUCTIONS
The problem of
motorist sight obstructions at un-gated grade crossings
is a subject not even mentioned by the FRA Administrator.
And yet, a 1998 study by the National Transportation Safety
Board concluded that in 57 percent of grade-crossing accidents
studied, motorist sight obstructions were found to exist.
Furthermore, FRA’s sister agency, FHA, recommended
motorist sight-obstruction standards in 1986, and very
similar tolerances have continually been advanced by AASHTO.
And finally, motorist sight obstructions have been identified
as a contributing cause of grade-crossing accidents in
a number of judicial proceedings. Some States have adopted
motorist sight-obstruction standards – on railroad
property only – but they are few in number and very
limited. This is a subject ripe for FRA advocacy, but one
that is clearly absent from the agency’s agenda.
III.
NEED FOR MORE GATES
There is irrefutable
evidence that gates are the safest informational/warning
device at grade crossings. In fact, FRA’s own accident
statistics show that on a unit-of-traffic basis, gates
are 3-6 times (depending on the year) more effective than
crossbucks in providing protection at grade crossings.
Moreover, while over the past 30 years the accident rate
per-crossing has declined steadily at public crossings
where many gates have been installed, the same rate has
increased at private crossings where gates are almost non-existent.
Unfortunately, the FRA Administrator did not address the
need for more gates, the effectiveness of gates, and/or
the financing of gates. Ideas such as: a dedicated public
fund for gate installations or railroads helping to fund
gate installations – were not raised. Rather, the
Administrator once again touted the motorist education
program as an effective way to reduce grade-crossing accidents.
Ignoring the fact that there is no credible evidence to
conclude anything about the effectiveness of the motorist
education program – largely presented by current
and ex-railroad employees – the Administrator inappropriately
implied that motorist education trumped gates as a safety
mechanism.
All in all, FRA
seemed to relish in two overall messages at the Hearing.
First, it touted the improvement in the grade-crossing
safety record and as with others, declared itself one of
the responsible parties for such gains. And second, it
emphasized its new “action” plan for addressing
grade-crossing issues. However, a close examination of
this plan reveals much that is more of the same: working
with partners, improving technology, expanding education,
closing crossings, enhancing enforcement of traffic violations,
improving data, etc. – in essence, doing a better
job of what currently is being done. But what is currently
being done generally falls within the mantra of the motorist
being responsible for virtually all grade-crossing accidents,
failure to recognize that many crossings are deficient
in their geography and/or motorist sight obstructions,
and being blind to the value of crossing gates. Alas, the
July Hearing was another disappointment from FRA, following
others as noted in a series on grade-crossing safety as
undertaken by the New York Times in 2004 and 2005. |