In
October of 1995, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
initiated a safety audit of the CSX Transportation Company
(CSX), one of the two major railroad systems serving Ohio.
(the other being the Norfolk Southern Railroad). Then,
as the number of CSX accidents accelerated in the summer
of 1997, FRA escalated its ongoing safety oversight of
the railroad by launching a full-scale, comprehensive examination
of CSX. An ensuing report entitled, Safety Assurance
and Compliance Program Report on CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
is not only revealing in regard to its conclusions, it
is also noteworthy as to a major missing link – a
link that should have been part and parcel of grade-crossing
safety. In this sense, the report is very telling about
how both the railroad industry and FRA partner in their
attitude regarding motorist sight obstructions at un-protected
grade crossings.
Overall, the FRA report is highly critical of CSX safety
efforts. It concludes that the railroad had a culture that
engendered an adversarial relationship between management
and labor, resulting in “instances in which line managers made decisions about
train operations which compromised safety, despite the concern
of their staff.” The report found that at CSX: (1) “safety
first” was not universally observed (2) harassment and
intimidation were evident, and (3) poor communications had
a negative impact on safety.
Specifically in regard to grade-crossing safety, three areas
were identified and reviewed. First, FRA had “concerns
about the prevalence of false proceed signal failures, near-collision
incidents involving trains and other rolling stock, highway-rail
grade crossing accidents, grade crossing signal activation
failures, and false activations.”
The report identified these deficiencies as largely being the
result of inadequate staffing levels that resulted in insufficient
time to perform tasks in a proper manner, and contributed to
gaps in communications. Two remedies were offered. First, it
was recommended that railroad managers reallocate a portion
of the signal supervisors’ non-supervisory duties to
other staff. And second, it was suggested that CSX review and
analyze staffing levels in the quest of identifying and fulfilling
needs. Rhetorically speaking, is this not an overstatement
of the obvious?
The second area specifically relating to grade-crossing safety
was poor visibility of flashing light signals. FRA found a
number of instances where signal lights were not aligned to
provide clearly visible warnings to approaching motorists.
Recommendations to CSX were to: (1) provide instructions for
signal maintenance that was in accordance with FRA regulations
and industry-wide guidelines (2) form subdivision, signal-inspection
teams specializing in grade crossings, and (3) develop a plan/schedule
to “repair, upgrade, or replace grade-crossing signals,
as needed to comply with current regulations.” While
special inspection teams may be a new venture for CSX, following
the law and developing plans are no more than expected/required
practices.
Finally, there was the matter of sight obstructions. During
inspections, FRA found numerous track defects at CSX, including
overgrown vegetation. The report concluded that at many locations,
vegetation had spread onto the right-of-way and pole lines
to such a degree, that it was hitting the sides of rolling
stock. Furthermore, such vegetation blocked the view of wayside
signs and signals, and adversely affected the functioning of
signal and communication lines. Thus, FRA recommended that: “CSX
should develop an Action Plan to survey the property to identify
all locations affected by excessive vegetation growth, prioritize
all locations, and institute a comprehensive, large-scale brush
control program. CSX should pursue such a program until the
problem is corrected. Subsequent annual maintenance programs
should include a sufficient amount of brush control to prevent
the present situation from recurring.”
Viewed in total, the three FRA recommendations are nothing
more than reminders to CSX to do the right thing – that
is, to fulfill its safety responsibilities in accordance with
FRA regulations, industry-wide standards, and common sense.
Furthermore, a missing link stands out in the area of sight
obstructions. The concern of FRA is solely related to overgrown
vegetation that inhibits the railroad’s sight lines.
And while it can be argued that such a concern is consistent
with present federal regulations (Code of Federal Regulations)
that address railroad, but not motorist, sight lines, the FRA
audit provided an opportunity for that agency to comment on
adequate motorist sight lines. After all, while it is dangerous
for train engineers and conductors not to be able to adequately
see railroad mile posts and signals, it is at least as dangerous
for motorists to be hindered in seeing approaching trains at
grade crossings. And if CSX was deficient in providing adequate
sight lines to itself – as FRA has found
– one can only imagine its dereliction in providing adequate
sight lines to motorists. In essence, the safety audit of CSX
reveals that both FRA and CSX deny responsibility for providing
motorists with the ability to adequately see approaching trains
at non-protected grade crossings.
Railroads form an integrated system throughout the U.S. with
common operating policies, procedures and practices. Thus,
it is not sensible to have varying sight-line standards depending
on State law. If FRA is really interested in saving lives,
it should institute a rule-making procedure to develop national
sight-line standards for motorists at grade crossings. If railroads
such as CSX are interested in fulfilling their public responsibility,
they should implement adequate, motorist sight-line standards
on their own. Grade-crossing ownership is shared between private
railroads and public road authorities. Both parties have a
responsibility to provide protection to motorists using grade
crossings. In regard to motorist sight lines, both the railroads
and the federal government have failed. The gap in the FRA
audit of CSX is a case in point. |